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Hilary Putnam was one of the most influential philosophers of the
20th century. His peers have called him “one of the finest minds I’ve
ever encountered” (Noam Chomsky) and “one of the greatest philosophers
this nation has ever produced” (Martha Nussbaum). Standard obituaries
covering his “life and times” are available in the mass media.1 This essay
1See, e.g., the New York Times (www.nytimes.com/2016/03/18/arts/hilary-
putnam-giant-of-modern-philosophy-dies-at-89.html), the Guardian (www.
theguardian.com/books/2016/mar/14/hilary-putnam-obituary), or the Huffington
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will focus exclusively on the legacy he has left from his published works
and from the way he has modeled a philosopher’s life.
Hilary Putnam was a towering figure in philosophy of language, phi-
losophy of mind, and in metaphysics, and special attention will be paid
(below) to those contributions. His influence, however, extends well be-
yond those boundaries. He has published works in dozens of different
research areas, of which the following is only a small sample. Early in his
career he contributed (with Martin Davis, Yuri Matiyasevich, and Julia
Robinson) to the solution of Hilbert’s 10th problem, a major result in
mathematics which, together with other related accomplishments, would
have warranted an appointment in a mathematics department. While his
central focus was not ethics and political philosophy he advanced a sus-
tained attack on the fact-value distinction – a central presupposition of
logical positivism and a position that he thought continued to influence
research in many areas to deleterious effect. His work in this area was ap-
plied not only to ethics and the philosophy of science but in a recent book
(edited with Vivian Walsh) he argued that in economic theory (as else-
where) facts and values are so “entangled” that there can be no such thing
as value-free economic theory.2 In the second half of his life, he turned in
earnest to his Jewish heritage, learned Hebrew, was bar mitzvahed at age
68, and wrote about Jewish philosophy.3
A list of the many and diverse contributions he has made to our intel-
lectual life would be too lengthy for this venue and, in the form of a list,
would not adequately capture the unifying elements of his philosophical
work. As important as are the theories and the arguments he has left
us, of equal importance is the ideal of philosophical inquiry that he has
embodied throughout his career. He is a rare example of someone who
relentlessly pursued an answer to one central question, never wavering as
he sought richer, more nuanced answers to the question: “What is the
nature of the mind-world relation?”
Throughout his career, and in virtually every one of his obituaries,
great emphasis has been placed on his uncommon penchant for “changing
his mind” – for attacking philosophical theories that he himself created.
The temptation is to attribute this to a quirky personality trait, as if he
had commitment issues of some kind. That, of course, is to completely
misunderstand not only the man, but the nature of his philosophical con-
tribution. To better understand the legacy he leaves us, this essay con-
siders the work he has pursued on the basic question of the mind-world
Post (www.huffingtonpost.com/martha-c-nussbaum/hilary-putnam-1926-2016_b_
9457774.html).
2H. Putnam and V. Walsh, eds. (2012): The End of Value-Free Economics, Rout-
ledge, New York.
3H. Putnam (2009): Jewish Philosophy as a Guide to Life: Rosenzweig, Buber,
Levinas, Wittgenstein, Indiana University Press, Bloomington.
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relation.
On the one hand, it seems perfectly obvious that there exists an objec-
tive, physical world and it is easy to theorize as if we have an omniscient,
God’s eye access to its nature. But we don’t. We are finite creatures,
with a very particular (and contingent) epistemic access to that reality.
Our sensory and cognitive access to reality is limited by the constraints
and particularities of this biological organism. So we ask:
1. What is the nature of cognition? What are minds that they are
capable of thinking about distant galaxies to which we lack physical
access?
2. What is language? How can linguistic symbols serve as the medium
which carries cognitive content – and how do they hook onto the
physical world?
3. And what of reality itself? Since we can’t assume that our cognitive
access to reality is literally transparent, as of an omniscient mind,
how might the world that we inhabit be conditioned by the cognitive
and sensory faculties which mediate our access to it?
Putnam has made countless contributions to the answers that we are
now able to give to these questions. He insisted that the three issues were
inextricably entwined, or (as he was fond of saying) the three “take in
each other’s laundry”. Just as Dante needed a guide (like Virgil) to direct
his steps through the underworld, consider Hilary Putnam our guide as
we navigate the perplexities surrounding mind, language, and reality. By
reviewing his legacy in these areas of inquiry, we will see much of the
progress that has been made on these questions during the past 75 years.
Putnam has been at the center of the most revolutionary developments.
While a student of logical positivists (including Hans Reichenbach and
Rudolf Carnap), Putnam was unflinching in his attacks on the excesses of
that philosophical movement. Logical positivism offered a very simplistic
account of the relationship between thought/language and the physical
world, which emphasized empiricism (and human sensory experience as
reported in “observation sentences”) at the expense of common sense real-
ism about objects in the world. For some positivists, this took the extreme
form of phenomenalism, the view that physical objects are nothing more
than “permanent possibilities of experience”. For Rudolf Carnap, one of
Putnam’s teachers, it resulted in a rejection of a realist interpretation of
the theoretical entities mentioned in scientific theories. Such terms (“elec-
tron”, “microbe”) were merely of instrumental value in predicting future
“observation statements” and so were not translated with ontological im-
port. This revealed a tension within 20th century analytic philosophy
between a methodological commitment to empiricism and an ontologi-
cal commitment to naturalism. Putnam judged that logical positivism
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emphasized empiricism at the expense of realism and he advanced now
famous arguments for both scientific realism – arguing that the success
of science would be a “miracle” if the entities referred to did not really
exist,4 and that mathematical realism – the existence of numbers – is
“indispensable” to scientific theorizing.5
Putnam also took on the two theories of mind that dominated during
the 1950s: behaviorism and mind-brain identity. Against behaviorism he
offered a thought experiment about a community of “super-spartans” who
experience (subjective) pain but never evince behavior expressive of that
pain6 and against the identity thesis he offered a new theory of mind,
functionalism, that has dominated cognitive science and philosophy ever
since.7 Drawing inspiration from his own work in the theory of recursive
functions, Putnam proposed that the essence of mental states is not what
they are made of but how they function. While today functionalism is
usually treated as a reductive theory (compared to several contemporary
alternatives), at the time it was a rejection of very reductive alternatives
in favor of a theory that was completely catholic with respect to the
metaphysical stuff of which minds might be made. Whether a human
organism, alien organism, silicon-based machine, or immaterial soul, each
would have the same type of mental state (e.g., belief or pain) so long as
they shared the same function (implemented the same software program)
within the intelligent system. His original “machine functionalism” gave
way to a more flexible “causal role functionalism” which defines mental
states in terms of the causal role it plays with regard to its intake of
information from the environment, its causal relations to other mental
states, and its contribution to system behavior. For over forty years,
functionalism has been the dominant theory of mind.
Putnam famously rejected functionalism8 because it couldn’t capture
the richness of the phenomena. He argued that plasticity of mental states
between different cognitive agents and even between states of the same
agent at different times made possible sameness of mental state in the
absence of sameness of functional properties. Yet, at the end of his life,
after many twists and turns in the development of his thinking, he still
described his position as a form of “liberal functionalism” – insisting that
4H. Putnam (1962): What theories are not. In Logic, Methodology and Philosophy
of Science, ed. by E. Nagel, P. Suppes, and A. Tarski, Stanford University Press,
Stanford, pp. 240–251.
5H. Putnam (1975): What is mathematical truth? In Mathematics, Matter, and
Method, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 60–78.
6H. Putnam (1963): Brains and behavior. In Analytical Philosophy Vol. 2, ed. by
R.J. Butler, Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 1–19.
7H. Putnam (1960): Minds and machines. In Dimensions of Mind, ed. by S. Hook,
New York University Press, New York, pp. 138–164.
8H. Putnam (1988): Why functionalism didn’t work. In Representation and Reality,
MIT Press, Cambridge, pp. 73–89.
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there remains an important truth in his original insight.
Next we turn to language. Until the late 1960s, the dominant view of
how words come to refer to objects in the world had been little changed
for thousands of years. Locke gave modern expression to this standard
internalist semantics in his “way of ideas”. What words mean, how they
pick out the objects to which they refer, is determined by the “ideas”
(the properties) that thinkers consciously “associate” with those terms.
The properties (odorless, colorless, tasteless, thirst-quenching liquid) that
I associate with a particular term (such as water) just are the meaning of
the word and the word refers to any object that has those properties. This
definite description theory of reference seemed not only the best theory,
but the only conceivable theory. If we say that “water” means “odorless,
colorless, tasteless, thirst-quenching liquid”, how could we all possibly be
wrong about the meaning of our own language?
Well, today, most philosophers and cognitive scientists think that we
were all wrong, due primarily to the arguments of Putnam and Saul Kripke
who, working independently, were reconceiving of how language works, in-
sisting that “the world” – one of our two poles – had not been given its
due in fixing the meaning of our words. Putnam began teaching these
ideas in 1966, but they got little traction until he finished a paper at the
end of 1972 titled “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’ ”, which had the additional
support of Saul Kripke’s famous 1970 lectures on “Naming and Neces-
sity”.9 The Kripke-Putnam “new theory of reference” (also called the
“causal theory” or “direct theory”) claimed that natural kind terms and
proper names are not definite descriptions but are rigid designators. Their
semantic content is indexically fixed, most commonly by an act of bap-
tism. A baby’s name is causally connected to a specific baby at baptism
(Kripke) and natural kind terms, like “water”, can be causally connected
to a particular kind of physical stuff by ostension – “that stuff is called
‘water’ ” (Putnam). Putnam argued that the meaning of the term “water”
was not captured by any description (odorless, etc.) but was attached to
that very kind of stuff (whatever its deep explanatory properties turn out
to be). If our scientists are correct and water turns out to be H2O, then
“water” refers to all and only those things that are H2O.
Virtually overnight (at least in academic time), a majority of philoso-
phers and cognitive scientists were convinced by these arguments. How
could such a thing happen? What kind of argument could they have
given to overwhelm 3000 years of philosophical momentum? It is re-
markable, but they gave no principled arguments. They just told stories
(which philosophers usually call “thought experiments”) and then asked
the reader “Is the stuff in the story ‘water’ or not?” The reader’s answer
9H. Putnam (1975): The Meaning of “Meaning”. In Mind, Language, and Reality,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 215–271. S. Kripke (1972/1980): Naming
and Necessity, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
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to the question, confirmed the new theory.
Putnam’s famous thought experiment that launched the new theory
is about Oscar, who lives on Earth and Twin Oscar who inhabits Twin
Earth that is in every way exactly like Earth except everywhere there is
H2O on Earth there is XYZ on Twin Earth. Since everything, except
the microstructure of water, is the same on both planets the question is:
Do all of the words in Twin English (the language Twin-Earthers speak)
mean the same thing as they do in English? The obvious difference might
be the meaning of the term “water”. If Locke is correct, however, and
“water” just means “odorless, colorless, tasteless, thirst-quenching liquid”
then the word “water” has the same meaning in both languages. Since
H2O and XYZ are both odorless, colorless, etc., they are both instances of
“water” and of twin-“water”. Putnam disagrees. He claims that if Oscar
were to visit Twin Earth and learn that their lakes do not contain H2O
but a fundamentally different kind of stuff, XYZ, Oscar would say:
“It may look like water but it is not really water because it is not H2O.”
Most readers asking themselves the question “Would I call XYZ ‘water’?”
answered in the negative. And when they did, the externalist revolution
was born. A negative answer to that question refutes Locke’ definite
description theory and confirms the new theory. One of Putnam’s most
famous sayings – “meanings just ain’t in the head” – became a rallying
cry.
The early arguments were just about proper names and natural kind
terms, but it soon became a global claim about all mental content. By
the time Putnam advanced his famous “brains in a vat” argument,10 one
of the least contentious premises of that argument was the claim that
“bearing a causal connection (of the appropriate kind)” was a necessary
condition for any word (even descriptive words) to genuinely refer to ob-
jects and properties in the physical world. During this period, tracking
theories of intentionality (or mental content) broke onto the scene exploit-
ing the Kripke-Putnam insight and offering powerful new theories about
how thought and language connects to objects in the world.11
If one stopped here in the survey of Putnam’s contribution to our
understanding of the relationship between mind, language, and reality
one would assume that Putnam could be easily pigeon-holed. Clearly,
he is committed to the following: (a) Metaphysical and epistemological
realism: The external world consists in mind-independent objects and
we are capable of having knowledge of them; (b) Semantic externalism:
Words refer to whatever real, mind-independent physical objects those
10H. Putnam (1981): Brains in a vat. In Reason, Truth, and History, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, pp. 1–21.
11For examples of tracking theories, see Fred Dretske’s Knowledge and the Flow of
Information of 1981 and Ruth Millikan’s Language, Thought, and Other Biological
Categories of 1984.
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words reliably track; (c) Long-armed functionalism: Mental state types
(like beliefs and pains) are individuated by the causal role each plays in
the economy of the organism (that is the “functionalist” part) and the
content of each mental state is fixed by whatever objects in the external
environment it is causally connected to (that is the “long-armed” part).
In 1976, this was Putnam’s philosophical profile and his mantel was
secure as the leading light advocating for metaphysical and scientific real-
ism. Not only had he offered the most compelling (“miracle”) argument
for scientific realism, but he had just delivered what many thought was
the coups de grace against idealism and antirealism – his externalist se-
mantic theory. The very essence of language is now grounded in causal
interactions between real, physical states of the agent and real, physical
objects in the external world. Putnam had built a realist juggernaut.
And yet, in December of 1976, as president of the Eastern Division of the
American Philosophical Association, he shocked the philosophical world
in his presidential address titled “Realism and Reason” by announcing
that he was now convinced that metaphysical realism is incoherent.
Putnam was a fan of P.F. Stawson’s modern reading of Immanuel
Kant’s critical philosophy (The Bounds of Sense, 1966) and became con-
vinced that Kant was right that our cognitive and sensory faculties help to
constitute the empirical world that we inhabit they do not simply discover
what Putnam called a ready-made world. His former realist comrades in
arms were aghast. Michael Devitt, a student of both Putnam and Quine,
wrote a paper titled “The Renegade Putnam” making no effort to hide his
chagrin at his mentor’s reversal. For Putnam, though, it wasn’t a betrayal
of any fundamental principle. His quest remained the same: To under-
stand the richness of the mind-language-world relationship, doing justice
to both poles, “mind” and “world”. He became convinced by Michael
Dummett’s arguments that the only coherent theory of how anyone comes
to understand the meaning of a language is by learning the “verification
conditions” of its statements – not the realist truth-conditions. He judged
that the combination of realism plus functionalism plus semantic exter-
nalism pushed the pendulum too far, by overemphasizing the reductive
contribution of an objective world.
The most surprising, and original twist that Putnam brought to the
realism-antirealism debate was the insight that semantic externalism does
not automatically settle the realism-antirealism dispute in favor of realism,
but complicates the picture in ways not fully appreciated. It is a basic
tenet of realism that radical skepticism is coherent (that it is possible
that our beliefs are systematically false). Antirealists traditionally reject
this tenet insisting that how things seem (at least ideally and in the long
run) cannot be fundamentally different from how they really are – and so
radical skepticism is incoherent. Appealing only to the causal requirement
on reference and disquotation in one’s language, Putnam’s “brains in a
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vat (BIV) argument” claims that we can know that we are not a brain in
a vat, thus ruling out radical skepticism. But if skepticism is incoherent,
that is precisely what antirealism affirms and realism denies. Thus, it
seems, that semantic externalism leads to a rejection of realism.
Hundreds of articles have been written about the BIV argument and
there is no consensus regarding its soundness. But the past thirty-five
years have shown since its publication that semantic externalism does in-
deed have revisionist consequences for how we are to understand our cog-
nitive access to a physical world. Philosophers continue to struggle with
how to reconcile the internalist psychological fact that I seem to have im-
mediate access to the content of my own thoughts with the (widely held)
conclusion that semantic externalism rules out “self-knowledge” with re-
gard to the content of my own mental states. Putnam has encouraged
serious reflection on the consequences of the externalist revolution.
Arguments like the BIV argument and “the model-theoretic argument”
(another famous Putnam argument against realism) lead him to defend
“internal realism”, a view that he eventually admitted was not a form of
realism after all, but of antirealism. For almost two decades he challenged
the realist orthodoxy of the time, insisting that standard realist versions
of long-armed functionalism had unresolved problems. In the 1990s, how-
ever, he recanted that position believing that he had swung the pendulum
too far back in the direction of the “mind” leaving the “world” too much a
product of the mind’s operations. He described his next position as a new
kind of “naive realism”. This coincided with the emergence of two new
theories – disjunctivism and representationalism – that Putnam flirted
with but ultimately rejected. He was convinced that his semantic exter-
nalism and a kind of realism was still a crucial part of the picture, but
that many current theories were going too far and reducing everything
mental to externalist relations.
To capture what was missing, he turned his energies in the last years of
his life to a study of perception, co-authoring several papers with Hilla Ja-
cobson.12 They proposed a new theory, “transactionism”, defending a dis-
tinction between “sensation” and “apperception” and insisting that there
are unconceptualized perceptions. In the process of this work, Putnam
made an unexpected concession to defenders of phenomenal consciousness
or qualia that he had never made before. (Qualia are properties of mental
states according to which “there is something that it is like” to be in that
state, like the feel of a pain or the look of a sunset). He made the conces-
sion to Ned Block, another student of his and a defender of a robust kind
of qualia that is not reducible to the mere informational content about
objects that semantic externalism can deliver. He says:13
12The last one of these papers is H. Jacobson and H. Putnam (2016): Against
perceptual conceptualism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24(1), 1–25.
13H. Putnam (2012): How to be a sophisticated naive realist. In Philosophy in
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... I agree with Block’s claim that qualia are probably identical
with brain events/states. Since qualia are what Block calls “mental
paint”, that means that I do not now see Block’s “phenomenism”
as incompatible with Jacobson’s and my “transactionalism”.
Currently, one of the major disputes in the philosophy of mind is that
between functional versus phenomenal intentionality. What role (if any)
do qualia play in determining the content of mental states and how might
they be integrated with functionalism and externalism? As Putnam left
us, he was turning his remarkable intellect to that question. We will feel
the loss of not having him as our guide through those challenging waters.
an Age of Science, ed. by M. De Caro and D. Macarthur, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, pp. 624–639.
